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Industrializing Countries of East
and Southeast Asia
Kojo Yelpaala*
The phenomenon of industrial legislation is not new in the world. Several
industrialized, non-industrialized, capitalist, and socialist countries all have at
different stages in their development used industrial legislation for the achieve-
ment of industrial goals, development targets and national welfare objectives.'
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I. It is impossible to catalog the various types of industrial legislation of all the countries in the
world. It is sufficient to note a few examples here. For industrialized market economies, see, e.g.,
legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany): GmbH-Gesetz, 1892 Re-
ichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 477, in 1898 RGBI 846 (Law on Private Companies of 1892); Aussen-
wirtschaftsgesetz, 1961 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI]l 481 (Law of Foreign Economic Relations of 1961);
Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 1951 BGBI 11153 and 1976 BGBI 11153 (Co-Determination Laws of 1951 and
1976); Tarifvertragsgesetz, 1969 BGBI 1 932 (Collective Agreement Act of 1969); Gesetz Gegen
Wettbewerbeschraenkungen, 1957 BGBI I v84 (Law Against Business Restrictions of 1957) Ware-
nzeischengesetz, 1968 BGBI 1 463 (Law on Trademarks of 1968); Patentgesetz 1968 BGBI 1154 (Law
on Patents of 1968). For the laws of the United Kingdom, see Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 & 11
Geo. 6, ch. 14; Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41; Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52;
Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22; Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74; Patents Act,
1977, ch. 37; Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 88. For socialist countries, see,
e.g., the legislation of Yugoslavia: Law No. 18/78, 1978 Sluzbenilist Socijalisticke Federatione
Republike Jugoslavije [SFRJ] (Law on Investment of Resources of Foreign Persons in Domestic
Organizations of Associated Labor); USTAV SFRJ (Constitution 1974); Law No. 44/60, 1960
Sluzbenilist Federatione Narodne Republike Jugoslavije [FNRJ] (Law on Patents and Technical
Improvements); Law No. 45/61, 1961 Sluzbenilist FNRJ (Law on Trademarks of Goods and Ser-
vices). These are only a few statutes of the system of statutes applicable to foreign investments. For
details on these countries, see United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC),
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This legislation has generally addressed labor relations, taxes, plant location,
exchange controls, and capital controls. What is perhaps new is its focus on the
behavior of Multinational Enterprises (MNE). The emergence of the MNE on the
world economic scene has introduced an elusive but important element in the
industrial policy calculus of nations.
The MNE enjoys a degree of flexibility which poses serious difficulties for
industrial policy makers. For its distinctive behavior, attributes, and effects need
not, and indeed often do not, correspond with the industrialization techniques
and objectives of host countries. Because of the possibility of negative effects on
host countries of MNE operation, and, perhaps more importantly, the need to
channel MNE operations toward the achievement of certain national objectives,
national legislatures, such as those in Latin America, have begun to focus legisla-
tive efforts not just on the MNE simpliciter but more on the distinctive behavior
of the MNE. Though industrial legislation exists both in industrialized and non-
industrialized countries, this article will address the impact of such legislation on
the behavior of the MNE and labor in the emerging industrial nations of East and
Southeast Asia.
The choice of these countries is dictated by a number of considerations. First,
some of these countries, in particular, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South
Korea), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), and Singapore, have been
involved in systematic industrialization supported by legislation designed to fa-
cilitate industrial growth.' Second, through such legislation and general eco-
nomic planning policies, these countries have assigned a significant role to
MNEs in certain industries earmarked for expansion.' At the same time, these
National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/26
(1983) [hereinafter cited as National Legislation].
2. The following statutes of the ROK are examples of statutes intended as a group to assist that
country's industrialization process: Law No. 2640 of 1973 (The Foreign Capital Inducement Act);
Law No. 1000 of 1962, (Commercial Code) (as amended); Law No. 2506 of 1973 (Trademark Act);
Law No. 2505 of 1973 (Patent Law); Law No. 911 of 1961 (Unfair Competition Prevention); Law No.
933 of 1961 (Foreign Exchange Control Act (as amended); Law No. 2180 of 1970 (Law for the
Establishment of free Export Zone); Law No. 286 of 1953 (Labor Standard Act); Law No. 1329 of
1963 (Labor Union Act); Law No. 4596 of 1969 (Provisional Special Law Concerning Labor Unions
in Foreign Investor Enterprises); Law No. 3872 of 1969 (Grievance Arbitration Law). In addition to
various statutes on labor, patents, and trademarks, the ROC has promulgated the following statutes
with specific reference to foreign investors: Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals, promulgated
July 14, 1954 (as amended); Statute for Encouragement of Investment, promulgated Sept. 10, 1960
(as amended); Enforcement Rules of the Statute for Encouragement of Investment, promulgated Jan.
II, 1961 (as amended); Applicable Scope of Strategic Industry, Exec. Decree promulgated Sept. 24,
1982 [hereinafter cited as Applicable Scope of Strategic Industry]. For description of the various taxes
in the ROC applicable to foreign investors, see INDUS. DEV. AND INV. CENTER OF TAIWAN, TAXES IN
TAIWAN (1981). Singapore is one of the countries with very few statutes specifically designed to deal
with MNEs. Since the late 1960s, it has maintained an open door policy towards MNEs and enacted
the Economic Expansion Incentives Act, Act. No. 36 (1967), which offers incentives to MNEs. It is
nevertheless important to read this statute together with other business and commerce-related statutes
such as those relating to patents, trademarks, taxes, labor, and free export zones similar to those of the
ROC and the ROK.
3. The governments of the ROK since the Park Chung Hee regime have not been satisfied with
sitting back and "letting the market system work itself." Jones and Sakong described the extent to
which the governments have been pervasively interventionist: "The Korean miracle is not a triumph
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countries have tried to control the participation of MNEs in other industries.
Third, these emerging nations have attracted the bulk of foreign direct investment
(FDI) activities from MNEs in developed countries. 4 Since these emerging indus-
trialized countries have, within a short time, achieved some measure of success in
industrialization, it is important for legal scholars and industrial policy makers to
determine the exact nature and impact of such legislation on the behavior of
MNEs and on the industrialization process generally.
The new focus of industrial legislation on the behavior of the MNE in develop-
ing nations is hardly surprising. As is obvious from the heated debate during the
Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the MNE is
perhaps the most controversial economic entity ever produced by the capitalist
economic system. Both during and after that session, the Group of 77 5 con-
demned the existing international economic system as manifestly unequal and
exploitative of the needy.6 It viewed the MNE as a convenient and willing conduit
through which the economic wealth of impoverished countries is siphoned off to
maintain affluent industrialized societies.
of laissez-faire but of a pragmatic non-ideological mixture of market and non-market forces where the
market works fine; where it doesn't, the government shows no hesitation in intervening by means that
range from a friendly phone call to public ownership." L.P. JONES & IL SAKONG, GOVERNMENT
BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE KOREAN CASE 3 (1980). This
interventionist attitude explains the desire of host governments to target certain industries for MNE
participation. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FINANCE, INVESTMENT GUIDE TO KOREA 21-22 (1983)
(classification of industries in terms of their perceived importance to the government) [hereinafter
cited as INVESTMENT GUIDE TO KOREA]. For the ROC, see Applicable Scope of Strategic Industry,
supra note 2. Though Singapore did not have specified strategic industries, its initial policies were
designed to encourage labor intensive manufactured exports. Its current policies include attracting
MNEs into sectors using a highly skilled labor force, such as high technology sectors like petrochem-
icals, industrial electronics, precision engineering, and aerospace. See Fong, Employment Develop-
ment and Basic Needs in Singapore, 119 INT'L LAB. REV. 495, 497 (1980).
4. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
5. The Group of 77 has become a generic term used to describe a large number of developing
countries, generally nonaligned, which over the years have often conferred and acted together within
and outside the United Nations General Assembly on several issues involving trade, investments,
economic development, and politics affecting developing countries. As a coalition, the group was
first noticed in the middle of the 1960s in the intra-assembly dynamics within the U.N. It was then
referred to as the 75 because that was the total number of states involved. By the time of the Sixth
Special Session of the General Assembly in 1974, the group had become well established as the
Group of 77. See R.O. KEOHANE, POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (Interna-
tional Conciliation No. 557, 1966).
6. The views of the Group of 77 were effectively articulated in a fiery speech by the late Mr. Houari
Boumediene, President of the Revolutionary Council and of the Council of Ministers of the People's
Democratic Republic of Algeria. 6th Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 7) at I-1, U.N. Doc. A/
PV/2207-2231 (1974). For example, Mr. Boumediene had the following to say about inequality:
In the eyes of the vast majority of humanity, it [the economic order of the world we live in
today] is an order as unjust and as outdated as the colonial order to which it owes its origin and
substance. In as much as it is maintained and consolidated and therefore thrives by virtue of a
process which continually impoverishes the poor and enriches the rich, this economic order
constitutes the major obstacle standing in the way of any hope of development and progress
for all the countries of the third world.
Id. at para. 36.
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This perception of the Group of 77 and several other critics of MNEs7 triggered
a new awareness of the role of the MNE in the industrialization process of host
countries. As a result, national legislatures have begun actively to design indus-
trial legislation to arrest the siphoning process and retain as many of the benefits
of MNE operations as possible.' At the international level, the impact on eco-
nomic development of the conduct of the MNE has triggered yet another debate
over the necessity and appropriateness of a code of conduct for MNE behavior.9
I. ATTRIBUTES OF THE MNE AND ITS REGULATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
The importance of these new concerns cannot be appreciated without under-
standing what the MNE is and what it has to offer to a host country. As an entity,
the MNE appears to defy definition. '0 One current attempt describes the MNE as
7. Several of the critics of MNEs are dependency theorists, Marxist or neo-Marxist intellectuals,
and liberal academics. See, e.g., R.J. BARNET & R.E. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974); C.V. VAITSOS, INTERCOUNTRY INCOME DISTRIBUTION
(1974); Emmanuel, The Multinational Corporations and the Inequity of Development, 18 INT'L Soc.
Sci. J. 754 (1976); Senghaas, Multinational Corporations and the Third World: On the Problem of the
Further Integration of Peripheries into the Given Structure of the International Economic System, 17
J. PEACE RESEARCH 257 (1975); dos Santos, The Multinational Corporation: Cell of Contemporary
Capitalism, 2 LATIN AM. RESEARCH UNITY STUD. 31 (1978); S. AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT
(1976); S. AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE (1976).
8. Several developing countries, particularly the newly emerging countries, have begun to see the
importance of systems of legislation in their industrialization process. See, for example, the following
legislative efforts of Mexico: Diario Oficial [D.O.], 9 marzo 1973 (Law for the Promotion of Mexican
Investment and Regulation of Foreign Investment); D.O., 30 deciembre 1972 (Law on Registration of
the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks); D.O., 10
Febrero 1976 (Law on Inventions and Trademarks). For Brazil, see Lei No. 4.131, 1962 Coleqdo das
Leis [Coleqfio], Vol. V (dez.) - Leg. (Foreign Capital Investment Law); Lei No. 5.772, 1971 Coleqfo,
Vol. VII (dez.) - Leg. (Code of Industrial Property); Lei No. 6.385, 1976 Coleqfo, Vol. VII (dez.) -
Leg. (Security Commissions Law). Similar legislative efforts exist in other countries. The United
Nations Center for Transnational Corporations has recently compiled various legislation affecting
MNE conduct in specific countries such as Argentina, Chile, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Kenya.
See National Legislation, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Wallace, International Codes and Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Update
and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAW. 441 (1983); Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises, 22 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1979); LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF
CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (H. Horn ed. 1980); Joelson, The Proposed Interna-
tional Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. h, rr'L L. 247 (1978).
10. The Multinational Enterprise as a phenomenon has been characterized by definitional problems
from its inception and has been defined differently by various observers. See, e.g., UNCTC, Transna-
tional Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination 158-161, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/38 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Transnational Corporations]; see also Multinational Corporations in World De-
velopment 5, Sales No. E. 73. 11. A. 11 (1973). Various definitions emphasize different criteria. For
instance, on criteria such as organizational structure and ownership, see Aharoni, On the Definition of
a Multinational Corporation, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION 4-5 (1972);
number of countries in which operations are carried on, see J.H. DUNNING, THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 16 (1971); size of total operations, see R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 4 (1971);
attitude of management (ethnocentric, polycentric, or geocentric), see Perlmutter, The Tortuous
Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION 53
(1972); Cosmo Corporation, see Ball, Cosmo Corp: The Importance of Being Stateless, in WORLD
BUSINESS 337 (C.C. Brown ed. 1970).
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"an enterprise that controls and manages production establishments-plants-
located in at least two countries. '""I This definition ignores the characteristic
attributes and distinctive behavior which are of central importance in assessing
industrial legislation intended to harness or control MNEs.
A. Structural Characteristics of the MNE
Conceptually and functionally the MNE is best understood as an international
system that owns or controls sometimes vast amounts of technological, financial,
managerial, human, and marketing resources. It is a global network of opera-
tions, services, and multiplant systems connected through a common resource
pool and a common operating strategy administered by a monocentric or poly-
centric management command system. Thus, it enjoys tremendous flexibility in
its operational decision process. Its decisions are not seriously limited by consid-
erations of distance, time, space, or regional, national, or cultural allegiances.
MNEs differ in size, geographic, and product diversification. Their complexity,
flexibility, and technical capabilities vary, depending on the available resources
and the number of countries in which they operate.
The flexibility inherent in the MNE management system permits its produc-
tion, import, export, pricing, dividend pay-out, and remittance policies to
change in response to costs, profit maximizing strategies, geo-political consid-
erations, and host government attitudes. 2 For example, an MNE might extract
raw material in one country for inputs in the manufacture of semifinished prod-
ucts in a second country, to be used in the manufacture of a finished product in a
third, to be marketed in yet a fourth country. 3 Thus, an MNE can through its
foreign affiliates shuttle resources from one country to another in a manner that
maximizes overall profits.
B. The Economic Influence of MNEs
The MNE is clearly one of the most powerful entities affecting the indus-
trialization of the world. According to a recent study, MNEs accounted for at
least one-fifth of total world output in the mid 1970s (excluding centrally planned
11. R.E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (1982).
12. MNEs' import/export policies, dividend pay-out, and dividend remittance behavior change
rapidly in response to various stimuli in the international environment. See, e.g., Horst, The Theory
of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior Under Different Tariff and Tax Rates, 79 J. POL. ECON.
1059 (1971); Horst, American Taxation of Multinational Firms, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 376 (1976); see
also Kopits, Dividend Behavior Within the International Firm: A Cross-Country Analysis, 54 REv.
ECON. & STATISTICS 339 (1972); Kopits, Intra-Firm Royalties Crossing Frontiers and Transfer
Pricing Behavior, 86 ECON. J. 791 (1976); Mutti, Tax Incentives and the Repatriation Decisions of
U.S. Multinational Corporations, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 241 (1981); Lall, Transfer Pricing by Multina-
tional Firms, 35 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STATISTICS 173 (1973).
13. The inherent flexibility in the MNE and its global system was vividly described by Newfarmer
and Mueller in a report to the United States (U.S.) Congress in 1975. See SUBCOMM. ON MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., IST SESS.,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC
AND NONECONOMIC POWER 14 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as BRAZIL AND MEXICO].
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economies). '4 Since then production by MNEs has been growing twice as fast as
world output.'5 In 1976, approximately 11,000 companies operated 82,000 for-
eign affiliates-an increase of about 20 percent over 1973. Approximately 370 of
the MNEs operated in at least 20 countries. In 1977 the sales of the foreign
affiliates of 866 of the world's largest industrial MNEs accounted for 27 percent
of their total sales volume. ' 6 The foreign content ratio of these enterprises is
substantial. ' 7
The influence of the MNE is also felt in the primary resource industries. It is
not unusual for a few MNEs to dominate world production of a particular mate-
rial. Neither is it unusual for the entire raw material output of a developing
country to be exported to a processing plant of an MNE in a developed country.' 8
The MNE may be very important to the economic existence of such countries.
C. The Need for Regulation of MNEs by Developing Countries
Given the significant influence of MNEs on the world economy, developing
countries cannot afford to ignore the impact of MNEs on their individual econo-
mies. In 1981 it was estimated that MNEs were responsible for approximately
one-third of the output in the manufacturing sector of developing countries and
about one-half of the output in the primary product sector.19 Host governments
should be particularly concerned with the operational flexibility of MNEs and
their ability to shuttle resources, production, sales, and wealth from one country
to another.
The structural flexibility of MNEs not only enables them to shift resources
from one country to another but also makes it difficult to predict their effect on
any single economy. One country might be the starting point of a sequence of
MNE activities culminating in negative externalities in several other countries
and substantial welfare benefits in a third. In order to ensure that countries
suffering the burdens of MNE operations also enjoy the benefits, countries linked
together by an MNE system must develop a concerted and uniform course of
legislative action. Unfortunately, industrial legislation in the past has on occasion
been motivated by the competitive spirit. 20
14. J.H. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 3
(1981).
15. Id.
16. ld.
17. Id. at 4; see also Transnational Corporations, supra note 10.
18. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Transnational Corpo-
rations and Expansion of Trade in Manufacturers and Semi-Manufacturers 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.2/197 (1978).
19. J.H. DUNNING, supra note 14, at 4.
20. An examination of the foreign investment statutes of these countries leave no doubt that they
are in competition for similar investment funds. See supra note 2. In addition, some countries, for
example the ROC and the ROK, have established very active agencies for disseminating information
on investment opportunities in their respective countries. See INVESTMENT GUIDE TO KOREA, supra
note 3; INDUS. DEV. AND INV. CENTER, ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN, R.OC.
(1983); SCIENCE-BASED INDUS. PARU ADMINISTRATION TAIWAN, R.O.C., YOUR PARTNER FOR
TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS IN ASIA (1983). For a discussion of the competition between host
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 389
It is through FDI that the economies of developing countries are connected
with and affected by MNEs. MNEs have always played a dominant role in the
FDI process. About 500 of the largest firms account for over 90 percent of all
FDI.21 Most of these firms are located in a few developed countries. Furthermore,
most MNEs invest in a limited number of developed and developing countries.
For example, in recent years, 11 newly industrializing countries were recipients of
over 50 percent of the total FDI from industrialized countries. 22 In the past
decade, MNEs based in the United States (U.S.) accounted for approximately 50
percent of the total FDI in developing countries.23 Japanese MNEs appear to
dominate the FDI scene in Asia, accounting for about 69 percent of the total.2 4
In view of the potential impact of MNEs on host countries, several of the East
and Southeast Asian countries have since the late 1960s and early 1970s decided
to use legislation to aggressively channel MNE operations and resources toward
targeted industrial goals. 2
D. Evolution of Industrial Legislation
The history of industrial legislation affecting MNE operations may be broken
into three phases. The earliest forms of legislation were simple pioneer-industry
tax incentive measures, generally of colonial origins. An example is the 1943
Income Tax Ordinance of Ghana. 26 Such legislation provided tax incentives for
FDI if MNE investment activities met certain pioneer industry criteria. 27
The second type of industrial legislation arose out of host government attempts
to participate in, and control MNE activities in primary product industries such
as crude oil drilling, and bauxite and copper mining. 28 Recognizing the crucial
importance of these non-renewable raw materials in their economic development,
countries such as Iran, Indonesia, Zambia, and Chile asserted their national
developing countries, see Stewart, Taxation and Technology Transfer, in CONTROLLING INTERNA-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 155-56 (S. Tagi, R.W.
Moxon & H.V. Perlmutter eds. 1980).
21. J.M. Connor, Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment by Food and Tobacco Manufacturers
2 (Feb. 1983) (unpublished manuscript).
22. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19
(5th rev. ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as INVESTING].
23. Id.
24. Id. at 18.
25. See Mason, Technology Transfer Control Systems: The Case of East and South East Asian
Developing Countries, in CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ISSUES, PER-
SPECTIVES AND POLICY 430 (S. Tagi, R.W. Moxon & H.V. Perlmutter eds. 1980).
26. Income Tax Ordinance, Law No. 27, 1943 LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST (Ghana); Industries and
Companies Act, Law No. 63, 1959 ACTS OF GHANA (Ghana); Industrial Incentives Law No. 45, 1956
LAWS OF JAMAICA (as amended).
27. Id.
28. For a discussion of the evolution of this type of legislation, see Main Features and Trends in
Petroleum Mining Agreements, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/29 (1983). See also the discussion of mineral
contracts raising the issue of national concerns in Walde, Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in
Transnational Mineral Contracts: Current Practice, Trends, and an Evaluation from the Host Coun-
try's Perspective, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33 (1977); Zom, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources: Recent Developments in the Petroleum Sector, 7 NAT. RESOURCES F. 321 (1983).
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sovereignty over these resources through legislation altering traditional conces-
sion agreements.29 Pioneer industry and primary product legislation was simple
in structure and generally not part of a system of interconnected laws to control
MNE behavior comprehensively.
The most recent type of industrial legislation is more sophisticated and gener-
ally designed to deal with the characteristics of MNEs while furthering overall
industrialization schemes. These laws are best understood as a system of comple-
mentary interconnected statutes with built-in flexibility that permits policy
makers to influence the behavior of MNEs according to industrial policy objec-
tives. Such comprehensive legislative systems often include the first two types of
legislation. Current models of this type of legislation exist in India, the ROK, and
the ROC.30 The models cover such subject areas as foreign investment induce-
ment or screening, tax incentives, exchange controls, intellectual property pro-
tection, licensing, labor, and customs duties. 31
The particular nature and operation of this most recent MNE legislation may
vary from country to country. However, host countries are particularly concerned
about the impact of MNE operations on economic efficiency, equity, and their
national sovereignty. 32 Such legislation, therefore, generally seems to promote
efficient inter-industry resource allocation. Even where MNEs presently allocate
resources in an efficient manner, there remains the question of the equitable
distribution of benefits among participants in the activities of a MNE. Policy
makers see the role of industrial legislation as including assurances that MNE
generated wealth will be equitably distributed among all the contributing factor
inputs, including the workers, customers, and the tax authorities of the host
country. However, the flexibility inherent in the MNE system raises questions
regarding the degree to which states enjoy freedom of action in industries domi-
nated by MNEs. Fearing the possibility of denationalization or loss of control
over their economies, 33 host countries resort to industrial legislation to ensure
that they retain maximum control over the allocation of their national resources.
Though comprehensive industrial legislation has existed in several countries
for a number of years, there have been few studies assessing its impact on the
behavior and foreign investment patterns of MNEs. Any such assessment would
first require an examination of the factors motivating MNE investment activities.
If host governments, believing that MNEs can play an important role in the
industrialization process, set out to control MNE activities, their success or
failure may depend, in part, on how closely related and sensitive their legislation
is to the real motivations and behavior of MNEs. Several theories explain MNE
29. Main Features and Trends in Petroleum Mining Agreements, supra note 28; Walde, supra note
28.
30. For legislation in India, see National Legislation, supra note 1. For the ROC and the ROK, see
supra note 2.
31. See, e.g., Law No. 2598 of 1973 (ROK) (Foreign Capital Inducement Act); Law No. 933 of
1961 (ROK) (Foreign Exchange Management Law); see also supra note 1.
32. J.H. DUNNING, supra note 14, at 9-10.
33. Denationalization studies have tried to explain the political implications of the MNE to host
countries. See, e.g., BRAZIL AND MEXICO, supra note 13; Connor & Mueller, Market Structure and
Performance of U.S. Multinationals in Brazil and Mexico, 18 J. DEVELOPMENT STUD. 329 (1982).
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foreign investment behavior. This article will examine four: the capital arbitrage
theory, the intangible assets hypothesis, the industrial organization theory, and
the internalization theory.
II. EXPLAINING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT BY MNEs
A. Capital Arbitrage
Early explanations of foreign investment by MNEs were drawn from the neo-
classical general equilibrium theory of international trade and capital mobility.3 4
According to this theory, foreign direct investment will flow from a capital-
abundant country to a capital-scarce country in response to relative factor propor-
tions and the ensuing differential rates of return on capital. 35 In other words,
capital moves at the margin. A country with a higher marginal rate of return will
attract capital from countries with lower marginal rates of return until the rates are
equalized.3 6 According to this theory, the MNE is an arbitrager of capital, 37 and
differential rates of return on capital are the most important forces guiding the
flow of capital across borders.
Implicit in this theory is the conclusion that industrial legislation, such as tax
incentives or foreign capital inducement statutes which effectively increase the
rate of return in the host country, trigger investment by MNEs. In fact, some host
countries, such as the ROK have plainly expressed the belief that such industrial
legislation would encourage investment by MNEs. 3 At a recent conference on
foreign investment, members of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
also voiced their belief in the importance of tax incentives for attracting FDI. 39
However, this theory has been seriously eroded by several severe attacks and the
apparent lack of correspondence between MNE behavior and differential rates of
return. 40 Moreover, the assumptions on which the arbitrage theory is based are
34. See generally Heckscher, The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income, 21
EKONOMISK TicsKiFrY 18 (1919); Nuske, Causes and Effects of Capital Movement, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS: SELECTED READINGS (J.H. Dunning ed. 1972); B. OHLIN, INTER-
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933).
35. See MacDougall, The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical
Approach, 36 ECON. REC. 13 (1960); see also Kopits, Taxation and Multinational Firm Behavior: A
Critical Survey, 23 IMF STAFF PAPER 624 (1976).
36. Kopits, supra note 35, at 628. For a useful survey of this theory and others, see Hufbauer, The
Multinational Corporations and Direct Investment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE FRON-
TIERS FOR RESEARCH 260, 291 (P.B. Kenen ed. 1975).
37. R.E. CAVES, supra note 11, at 31-32.
38. See Korea May Simplify Rules to Draw Foreign Investors, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1983, at
10. In fact, the ROK legislature has enacted a statute which liberalizes the incentives for foreign
investments. See Law No. 1802 of 1966 (as amended) (Foreign Capital Inducement Act).
39. See Japanese Businessmen Air Their Grievances Over ASEAN's Climate for Investment, Asian
Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1983, at 6.
40. Several of the theoretical attacks on the capital arbitrage theory have been advanced by the
same theoreticians advancing the industrial organization theory of the FDI. See, e.g., R.E. CAVES,
supra note I1; C.P. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD: Six LECTURES ON DIRECT
INVESTMENT (1969); I.M. GROSSACK, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATIONAL INTER-
EST 114 (1979); J.M. CONNOR, THE MARKET POWER OF MULTINATIONALS: A QUANTITATIVE ANALY-
SIS OF U.S. CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MExico (1977); Hufbauer, supra note 36, at 260.
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too restrictive to permit any serious conclusions regarding the actual behavior of
MNEs. 41
B. Intangible Assets Hypothesis
Critics of the capital arbitrage theory believe that the possession of knowledge
is central to a MNE's decision to engage in foreign operations. Several writers
have argued that the real advantage of the MNE over the non-MNE and local
firms lies in its exclusive possession of some intangible asset or proprietary
knowledge such as production secrets or managerial and marketing expertise. 42
MNEs go abroad to use these intangible assets and to collect rents on them.
Thus, Posner43 and others" have stressed the role of technology and human skills
in foreign investment.
However, the possession of intangible assets or proprietary knowledge cannot
alone explain MNE behavior in FDI because MNEs can exploit such advantages
through means other than FDI. They may choose to serve foreign markets
through exports or they may assign or license their know-how or intangible assets
to a local producer. The intangible assets theory45 argues that MNEs engage in
foreign operations, instead of licensing or exporting, because of the market
imperfections in arm's-length contracts involving intangible assets and the costs
of exploiting foreign markets through exports. 46
According to the market imperfection hypothesis, certain characteristics of
intangible assets prevent their efficient sale in conventional markets. Intangible
assets are thought of as a public good in that they can be exploited over and over
again by different firms without depletion. 47 In addition, the marginal cost of
their use abroad by any enterprise approaches zero. From the point of view of
societal resource allocative efficiency, the rental price of such intangible assets
should be close to zero. While the owners of intangible assets will not part with
41. The assumptions underlying the neo-classical theory of FDI include the following: perfect
competition, identical linear production functions, identical tastes, and no factor intensity reversals.
Economists have found it convenient to refer to the theories proposed by Heckscher and Ohlin, see
supra note 34, as a joint Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Any standard text on international trade refers to the
theory of comparative advantage as such. See, e.g., M. CHACHOLAIDES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
THEORY AND POLICY 206 (1978); Samuelson, International Trade and the Equalization of Factor
Prices, 58 ECON. J. 165 (1948); Samuelson, International Factor Prices Equalization Again, 59
ECON. J. 181 (1949); Samuelson, A Comment on Factor Prices Equalization, 19 REV. ECON. STUD.
121 (1952).
42. See Gruber, Mehta & Vernon, The R & D Factor in International Trade and International
Investment of United States Industries, 75 J. POL. ECON. 20 (1967); Horst, Firm and Industry
Determinants of the Decision to Invest Abroad: An Empirical Study, 54 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
258 (1972); Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporation, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 36 (C.P. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
43. See Posner, International Trade and Technical Change, 13 OXFORD ECON. PAPER 323 (1961).
44. See Keesing, Labor Skills and International Trade: Evaluating Many Trade Flows with a
Single Measuring Device, 47 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 287 (1965); Vernon, International Invest-
ment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 30 Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966); G.C. HUFBAUER,
SYNTHETIC MATERIALS AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966).
45. See R.E. CAVES, supra note 11, at 3-4.
46. See id.
47. Johnson, supra note 42, at 36.
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 393
them for nothing, the renters or licensees would prefer a very small rental price.
Since the appropriate price is at issue, MNEs will not be able to exploit them
fully in any arm's length transaction. Therefore, MNEs would prefer to engage in
foreign operations in order to profit fully from intangible assets. Moreover, in any
arm's length transaction for knowledge, the terms are likely to be distorted by
mutual distrust and suspicion between the parties. This is sometimes complicated
by serious disparities in the bargaining power of the assets' owners and licensees.
Given these perceptions of the nature of intangible assets, several host govern-
ments have legislatively intervened in arm's-length transactions between MNEs
and local licensees to equalize the bargaining relationship and bring the price and
other terms as close as possible to allocative efficiency goals. 48 These govern-
ments believe that access to technology on reasonable terms is crucial to indus-
trialization. In many developing countries this type of industrial legislation grants
administrators and economic planners significant discretionary power to super-
vise the transfer of technology to targeted industries with respect to its price,
quality, or quantity. The nationality of the licensee is often the crucial factor
triggering government intervention. This type of industrial legislation, found in
the ROK, the ROC, and the Andean Pact countries, 49 seeks to guarantee some
contractual and market advantage for the local licensee. According to the intangi-
ble assets hypothesis, it should induce greater FDI in industries in which MNEs
can use their knowledge to the greatest profit advantage. Thus, if the nationality
of the licensee triggers government intervention, the MNE will likely establish an
affiliate in the host country to use and control the technology.
C. Industrial Organization Theory.
The industrial organization theory 50 explains the growth of the MNE and its
FDI behavior in terms of oligopolistic market structures. According to this the-
48. See, e.g., JUNTA DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA, ANDEAN PACT TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
(1976). In particular, see the appendix containing Decisions 84 and 85 of the Cartagena Agreement
Commission adopted during the 13th period of Extraordinary Meetings of the Cartagena Agreement
Commission, May-June 1974. See also Decision 84, Cartagena Agreement Commission, 13th Period
of Extraord. Sess. (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1478, 1489 (1974).
49. See id.
50. The industrial organization theory had its origins in a seminal doctoral dissertation by Hymer
in 1960. Hymer's major thesis was that any attempt to explain the FDI behavior of MNEs must first
explain why MNEs control or seek to control their foreign operations. To answer this question, he
offered two explanations which are both related to market imperfections. The first market imperfec-
tion stems from the industrial characteristics of the markets in which MNEs operate. Where a
particular industry is characterized by horizontal or bilateral monopoly or oligopoly it might be
profitable for the market participants to engage in some collusive behavior. Such collusive behavior
could take the form of joint ownership and control of the firm by several MNEs within the same
industry. Ownership and control of these foreign operations would then permit MNEs to generate
monopoly rents by removing competition. The second reason why MNEs will desire to control their
foreign operations has to do with the imperfections in the rental markets. When the markets for
renting, assigning, or leasing firm-specific advantages are imperfect, the MNE owning such advan-
tages cannot exploit fully the rents attributable to them. The industrial organization theory is closely
related to the intangible assets hypothesis discussed above. See S.H. HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FORMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1976) (Ph.D
dissertation published by M.I.T. Press).
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ory, the advantage of MNEs lies not so much in possessing some unique intangi-
ble asset as in the stable structural traits of their industries.5 Oligopoly,
characterized by differentiated products based on technology protected by pat-
ents, or advertising protected by registered trademarks and brand names, goes to
the very root of the FDI process in horizontal investments. Oligopoly, and not
necessarily product differentiation, also explains vertical investments. 52
In the industrial organization theory economists have developed a well estab-
lished explanation of the growth of the MNE's FDI process.53 According to the
theory's leading advocate, those countries with industries having the following
structural characteristics are likely sources of FDI: oligopoly with product differ-
entiation; high research and development intensity geared towards knowledge
creation; and substantial barriers to entry.5"
It should be noted that oligopolistic market advantages describe a seller's
concentration. Therefore, where a few firms dominate an industry, product differ-
entiation becomes an effective tool for the accretion and retention of market
power. Product differentiation, in combination with the legal protection of trade-
marks and brand names, also helps the oligopolist keep competitors out of the
market at home and abroad. Given their size, financial resources, and marketing
techniques, MNEs can more easily bear the significant costs associated with
product differentiation through advertising. These oligopolistic advantages con-
stitute significant barriers to entry.55 Since these hindrances to competition exist
both at home and abroad, MNEs created for monopoly profits seek to exploit
their protected advantages abroad within industries exhibiting the same structural
traits as those they are involved in at home.
The industrial organization theory has some interesting implications for the
behavior of MNEs in host developing countries. First, if ownership and control
are central to the MNE, then one should observe a marked preference among
MNEs for countries and industries in which the opportunity to own and control is
greatest. They should prefer to operate in countries permitting at least majority
ownership, and at best 100 percent ownership, of subsidiaries by foreign inves-
tors. Thus, where the host government requires majority local ownership, such as
Nigeria,56 the theory dictates that MNEs will reduce their involvement. However,
the issue of control is not that simple. MNEs may not have de jure control but
51. Caves, International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment, 38
ECONOMICA 1(1971).
52. Id.
53. See C.P. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 40; R.E. CAVES, supra note 11, at 31-32; Caves, supra
notes 51 and 37; FT. KNICKERBOCKER, OLIGOPOLISTIC REACTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISE (1973).
54. Caves, supra note 51.
55. The advantages of MNEs were recently described as monopolistic advantages. See generally
Lall, Monopolistic Advantages and Foreign Involvement by U.S. Manufacturing Industry, 32
OXFORD ECON. PAPER 102 (1980).
56. The appropriate Nigerian statute dealing with this is the decree popularly known as the
Indigenization Act. It was promulgated as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977, Decree
No. 3, 1977 ANNUAL VOLUME OF THE LAWS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, at A 17. This
statute contains several provisions stipulating the degree of maximum foreign participation in differ-
ent categories of business.
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might well have de facto control over operations majority-owned by local part-
ners. Industrial legislation tends to stress a legal right of control while MNEs
might insist on effective or operational control. The impact of majority local
participation or indigenization statutes on MNE behavior is therefore unclear.
Second, the theory suggests that the host country eager to attract MNEs should
provide them with industrial property laws-patent, copyright, trademark, and
trade secrets statutes-which facilitate monopoly control over the market. Mo-
nopolization by MNEs is easiest if the host country's laws permit MNEs to
replicate their home, oligopolistic market structures. Indeed, industrial legisla-
tion which targets certain industries for development through legal controls,
inducements, and intellectual property protection laws may be unintentionally
responding to the characteristic attributes and distinctive behavior of MNEs.
D. Internalization Theory
The internalization theory is the most ambitious attempt yet to develop a
comprehensive theory of the MNE and the FDI process. 57 Internalization may be
defined as bringing under common ownership and control the same activities
linked together by markets. 58 Internalization will take place if there are distor-
tions or market imperfections in an MNE's goods and factor markets. The basic
goal of internalization is efficiency. The operational efficiency of any business
depends on the degree to which it can coordinate various aspects of its activities
through efficient external goods and factor markets. However, the external mar-
kets for several intermediate products-defined broadly to include intangible
assets, human skills, knowledge, and semi-finished products-are either ineffi-
cient or difficult to organize.59 Internalization permits a firm to bypass these
inefficiencies or to replace them with its own internal and therefore more efficient
set of markets. Internalization across national boundaries explains foreign pro-
duction, sales, and other operations of MNEs. 6°
The internalization paradigm suggests that the MNE is an efficient alternative
to a less than free trade economy.6 If the world were characterized by free trade,
there would be no need for the MNE. However, perfectly free trade among
nations does not exist. The rise of the MNE and the FDI process is then an
efficient second best response to market imperfections. 62
The market imperfections that may trigger internalization stem from two
sources: exogeneous government-induced inefficiencies and normal market
failure in the goods and factor markets. 63 Government-induced imperfections
normally arise from government intervention in the international markets through
57. For the original explication of the theory, albeit in a domestic context, see Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
58. P.J. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 33 (1976).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Rugman, Internalization as a General Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Re-Appraisal of
the Literature, 116 WELTWIRTSCHASTLICHES ARCHIV. 365, 366 (1979).
62. Id. at 367.
63. P.J. BUCKLEY & M. Casson, supra note 58, at 38-39.
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tariffs and non-tariff barriers. They may also arise from legislative controls and
restrictions on international capital flows, foreign exchange regulations, tax in-
centives, and discrepancies between corporate tax rates among countries. These
imperfections provide an incentive for internalization across national boundaries.
For instance, exchange control restrictions or corporate tax differentials may
induce an MNE to shift its profits from one country to another through its own
internally controlled transfer pricing system by the use of a foreign subsidiary.64
Similarly, non-government market failures promote internalization. For in-
stance, imperfections may exist in the intermediate goods markets where the
transactions are characterized by significant time lags without efficient futures
markets, or in markets in which discriminatory pricing is prevalent. Significant
disparity in the bargaining power between buyers and sellers can also result in
market failures, leading to internalization. Finally, in the case of bilateral con-
centration of market power, the cost of sanctions inherent in the bargaining
process creates some uncertainty and therefore may require some joint control or
ownership. 65 Any of these market imperfections could induce an MNE to create
its own internal, efficient markets for these goods.
The internalization theory appears to explain the dynamism of MNEs. Their
adaptability, flexibility, and strong preference for controlling their own opera-
tions should, according to this theory, be seen as part of the broader global profit
maximization purpose of MNEs. The extent to which any industrial legislation
would affect them depends on how restrictive such legislation is of MNE behav-
ior. Any rule that effectively restricts the ability of MNEs to shuttle their re-
sources and engage in intra-firm transactions deprives MNEs of their economic
justification. As in the case of control, the assessment of laws seeking to restrict
the behavior of MNEs should be based on actual effects rather than on intended
legal effects. The next sections illustrate the probable effects of various types of
legislation on the behavior of MNEs in light of their known characteristic
behavior.
III. THE EFFICACY OF TAX INCENTIVE LEGISLATION
Measuring the efficacy of tax incentive legislation on the behavior of MNEs is
not easy. Nevertheless, the capital arbitrage theorists and industrial policy makers
seem to agree on the probable impact of tax incentive legislation on the behavior
of MNEs. Both believe that incentives granted to MNEs in the form of tax
holidays, tax reductions, and other tax advantages influence the location of
MNEs' production facilities. 66 Such measures, in their view, encourage MNEs to
respond to the foreign investment inducement policies of host governments.
Therefore, MNEs can be expected to flock to countries offering such incentives
and into those industries targeted by such statutes. However, the available statis-
tics fail to support the claims of the theory and policy makers.
Incentive legislation is common in all the categories of developing countries:
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 34-39.
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low income countries (LICs), middle income countries (MICs), newly indus-
trializing countries (NICs), and members of the Organization for Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC).67 If the theory were correct, all these countries would
attract a significant amount of MNE operations in the form of FDI. Instead, the
available statistics seem to confirm a different pattern of MNE behavior. Accord-
ing to the statistics, MNEs originate from a few industrialized countries and
locate their operations in a few developed and developing countries. 68
Even with very liberal tax incentives, developing countries, as a group, have
always been least attractive to MNEs. Between 1967 and 1975, FDI in developing
countries dropped from 33 percent of the total FDI to 26 percent while that of the
developed market economies increased from 69 percent to 74 percent. 69 Within
developing countries, the MNEs are most attracted to the MICs such as the ROK,
the ROC, Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil and Argentina, rather than to the LICs
such as Niger and Somalia.
As is obvious from Table 1, NICs (only 11 in number) accounted for a huge
portion of the total FDI in developing countries between 1977 and 1981-as much
as 61 percent in 1979. These figures demonstrate the apparent unattractiveness of
LICs; yet incentive legislation is as prevalent in the LICs as in the NICs. If tax
incentive legislation were important in the MNE plant location decision process,
the gap between NICs and LICs would be narrower. Furthermore, the similarity
of tax incentives among developing countries, caused by avid competition among
them for scarce MNE funds, undercuts the argument that differential tax incen-
tive policies play a role in MNE plant location decisions. Thus, it is very difficult
to explain the attractiveness of the NICs on the basis of their tax incentive laws.
About half of the MNE operations are in tax havens or off-shore banking
Table 1
Share of Developing Country Groups in Allocated
Development Assistance Countries Foreign Direct
Investment Flows (NET) 1977-81
(figures in percentages)
1977 1979 1981
LIC 8 5 4
MIC 19 31 27
(off-shore banking centers) (7) (19) (15)
NIC 51 61 44
OPEC 22 3 25
Total 100 100 100
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Investing in Developing Countries 21 (5th rev. ed. 1983).
67. INVESTING, supra note 22, at 19.
68. Transnational Corporations, supra note 10.
69. Id. at 237.
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centers. These countries largely attract holding companies and other MNE affili-
ates not designed to carry out any substantial operations in manufacturing, sales,
or other business within the country. Tax havens in which foreign source income
is not taxed, are the most attractive for this type of FDI. These countries help
MNEs work their international system to an advantage by enacting the tax,
confidentiality, and exchange control laws that allow MNEs to pool earnings for
reinvestment purposes from subsidiaries in other countries.70 However, such laws
can hardly be said to constitute industrial legislation since their objectives are not
industrial development as such.
The casual observer of the efforts of countries such as the ROK and the ROC to
attract business and of the resulting level of MNE activity in these countries,
might conclude that tax incentive legislation has had a positive effect on invest-
ment by MNEs. However, several studies conducted since the 1950s have cast
serious doubts on the efficacy of such statutes. 71 Most survey studies found
incentive legislation to be of low significance in the motivational scale of MNEs.
Though more recent econometric studies arguably show some relationship be-
tween differential tax rates and MNE behavior, they included all known moti-
vational factors for FD172 and could not isolate the effects of taxes on MNE
behavior. In fact, there is no general theoretical or empirical basis for tax incen-
tive legislation as a motivator for MNE foreign investment. 73
Since industrial legislation is better understood and evaluated as a system of
interconnected statutes, it is likely that tax incentives do not by themselves
influence the behavior of MNEs. However, when combined with other statutes
dealing with ownership, related party transactions, imports, exports, and indus-
trial property protection, they may marginally influence the general calculus of
MNE plant location decisions.
IV. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATION ON MNE BEHAVIOR
To explain the impact of industrial legislation on MNE behavior it is best to
remember that no single theory can explain the FDI behavior of MNEs. MNE
70. For a rigorous investigation of the phenomenon of reinvestments, see D.G. HARTMAN,
DOMESTIC TAX POLICY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SOME EVIDENCE 13 (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Inc. Working Papers Series No. 784, 1981).
71. See also Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56 COLuM.
L. REV. 815, 843 (1956); Lent, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries, in READINGS ON TAXATION
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 370 (R. Bird & 1. Oldman eds. 3rd ed. 1978); Surrey & Sunley, General
Report-Tax Incentives on Instruments for Achievement of Government Goals, LXa CAII. DR.
FISCAL INT'L 30-35 (1976); Alexandrowicz, Tax Treaties Between the United States and Developing
Countries: The Need for a New U.S. Initiative 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 159, 161 (1971); E.R. BARLOW &
I.T. WENDER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TAXATION 215 (1955).
72. See, e.g., Batra & Ramachandran, Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade
and Investment, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 278 (1980); Hartman, The Effects of Taxing Foreign Investment
Income, 13 J. PUB. EcoN. 213 (1980); Horst, The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal
Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1059 (1971); Horst, American
Taxation of Multinational Firms, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 376 (June 1977).
73. See Yelpaala, The Efficiency of Tax Incentives within the Framework of the Neoclassical
Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEX. INT'L L. J. 365 (1984).
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actions closely resemble those predicted by the intangible assets and the indus-
trial organization theories, but a complete explanation must also draw from the
firms' overall profit or growth objectives. MNEs invest abroad to exploit their
know-how if that fits into their system of interconnected operations for profit
maximization and growth. For MNEs to achieve these objectives, however, the
opportunity must exist for them to engage in their distinctive behavior of control-
ling the system and each of its component parts run by their foreign affiliates.
Determining the impact of industrial legislation on the behavior of MNEs there-
fore requires an examination of the extent to which such legislation facilitates or
restricts their ability to control their operations.
The various measures of countries in the East and Southeast Asian regions
incorporate mixed objectives. On the one hand, foreign capital inducement stat-
utes and free export zone laws seek to attract FDI into industries considered
important for the industrialization process of host countries.7 4 On the other hand,
other provisions of the foreign capital inducement laws restrict the entry of
foreign investors into certain industries through foreign investment screening
procedures and ownership limitations.75
A. Patterns of MNE Investment Behavior
In the case of foreign investment statutes, several countries have earmarked for
MNE operations certain manufacturing activities requiring high capital expendi-
tures, complex technology, 'or the use of local resources. By law, MNEs can
establish majority or wholly-owned subsidiaries in these industries. The theory
of FDI suggests that MNEs tend to locate in those industries in which they can
exploit their monopolistic advantages. MNEs have generally enjoyed such advan-
tages in manufacturing. In 1976, manufacturing accounted for about 45 percent
of U.S. MNE operations, 35 percent of Japanese MNE operations and 70 percent
of West German MNE operations.76 In the case of developing countries, the
concentration of MNEs in manufacturing follows the same pattern. According to
some OECD estimates, 42 percent of the total stock of FDI in developing coun-
tries is in manufacturing. U.S. MNE activity in manufacturing is 39 percent of
total U.S. FDI, while that of Japanese and West German MNEs is 37 percent and
68 percent, respectively. 77
Statistics for certain developing countries are even more striking. In 1975, 80
percent of the stock of FDI in the ROK was in manufacturing. The concentration
of MNE activities in manufacturing fell by almost ten percentage points to 71.2
percent by 1982. However, as demonstrated in Table 2, MNE dominance of
74. See supra note 2.
75. See supra note 2. Some countries such as the ROC have no statutory ownership limitations.
However, government preference for local majority ownership is said to be an undeclared rule. See,
e.g., Wan, A Comparative Study of Foreign Investment Laws in Taiwan and China, 11 CAL. W. INT'L
L. J. 236, 253 (1981). For the ROK, see Yoon, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in the Republic of
Korea, 10 IN'L LAW. 729 (1976); Lee, The Effectiveness of Incentives Under the Foreign Capital
Inducement Act of Korea, 8 KOREAN J. COMp. L. 110 (1980).
76. Transnational Corporations, supra note 10, at 242 table 111-50.
77. INVESTING, supra note 22, at 26.
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Table 2
Foreign Investment Approvals by Industry
Republic of Korea (end 1982) (in thousands of U.S. dollars)
No. of Composition
Projects Amount (%)
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHERY 41 $ 13,866 1.0
AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY 22 5,923 0.4
FISHERY 19 7,943 0.6
MINING & MANUFACTURING 749 1,025,822 71.4
MINING 12 2,817 0.2
MANUFACTURING 737 1,023,015 71.2
Foods & Beverages 22 42,807 3.0
Textile & Wearings 67 67,808 4.7
Wood Products 3 1,113 0.1
Chemicals 108 319,344 22.4
Medicine 24 38,588 2.7
Fertilizer 4 41,975 2.8
Petrochemicals 4 31,535 2.2
Ceramics 22 14,387 1.0
Iron & Steel Metallics 67 63,232 4.4
Machinery and its Spare Parts 121 89,600 6.2
Electrical & Electronics 178 221,487 15.3
Transportation Equip. 8 52,731 3.8
Others 109 38,351 2.6
SERVICES 91 396,747 27.6
Banking 11 87,404 6.1
Construction & Services 31 68,669 4.8
Electricity 2 3,395 0.2
Transport. & Storage 13 30,632 2.1
Hotel 34 206,647 14.4
Total 881 $1,436,445 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea, Investment Guide to Korea (94) (1983).
manufacturing in the ROK continues. Table 3 confirms a similar picture of
concentration in the ROC where manufacturing accounted for 75 percent of MNE
operations. In Singapore, MNEs accounted for, on the average, almost 80 percent
of all manufacturing investments as shown by Table 4. Other studies confirm a
similar pattern in other countries. 78
Clearly, manufacturing is vital to both the host countries and the MNEs.
Industrial legislation, such as that enacted by the ROK, the ROC, and others,
facilitating the building of plants and permitting full or majority foreign
ownership is exactly what MNEs desire in making their locational decisions.
Such legislation encourages MNEs to locate in industries in which they have
previously operated. According to industrial organization theory, legislation
78. Transnational Corporations, supra note 10, at 259 table 111-50.
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which includes patent, trademark, and other intellectual property protection stat-
utes permits-indeed, encourages-MNEs to reproduce their home oligopolistic
market structures in host countries. In fact, when, as in the ROK, the ROC, and
Singapore, the host countries have an aggressive export policy for manufactured
goods supported by various export incentives and the export-free zones,79 MNEs
are able to operate their international systems smoothly.
Export-free zones were designed to cut red tape and reduce administrative
costs associated with normal investment screening procedures.80 They attracted
primarily specialized, labor-intensive activities in industrial sectors such as elec-
tronics, electrical appliances, machine tools, small machines, cameras, watches,
and radios.8' Historically, these are the product lines which have been most
attractive to MNEs. As Tables 2 through 4 demonstrate, in 1982 MNE activities
in the ROK, the ROC, and Singapore were concentrated in these product lines.
MNE investment in electrical products and electronics was about 15 percent of
total investment in the ROK and 28 percent in the ROC. Most of the MNEs
operating in this sector in the ROC were from the U.S., Japan, or Europe. The
MNEs in the ROC also devoted ten percent and eight percent of their operations
to metals and machinery, and equipment, respectively.
MNEs were attracted to these sectors for several reasons. The cost of labor, for
example, in the ROC and in the ROK, as compared to the U.S. and Japan, was
significantly lower.82 Singapore also enjoyed a comparative labor cost advantage
over the U.S., although not over Japan.83 Moreover, the productivity of labor in
the ROC and the ROK was as high or higher in certain product lines than in the
U.S.8 In addition, the host governments assured MNEs that they would maintain
tight control over the conduct of labor within the export-free zones.85 As a result,
it became common practice for MNEs to import, duty free, materials or compo-
nent parts from their various operations in developed countries to be processed or
assembled in these export-free zones for global re-export to their other affiliates.
B. Impact on Labor
MNEs appear to make a significant contribution to the direct and indirect
employment effects in these countries. 86 Studies which have addressed the rela-
79. The ROK is one example of a developing country which has established a free export zone
through statute. See supra note 2.
80. See Scott, Foreign Trade, in ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN 338
(W. Galenson ed. 1979).
81. See Little, An Economic Reconnaissance, in ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
IN TAIWAN 478 (W. Galenson ed. 1979).
82. For instance, Scott reported the following comparative hourly wage rates for the following
countries in 1972: U.S. $2.75, Germany $1.90, Japan $1.20, the ROK $0.22, the ROC $0.20. See
Scott, supra note 80.
83. See T. OZAWA, MULTINATIONALISM, JAPANESE STYLE 90 (1979).
84. Scott, supra note 80, at 360.
85. See I E. UTRECHT, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
52 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Galenson, The Labor Force, Wages, and Living Standards, in ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN 384, 388 (W. Galenson ed. 1979); Watanabe, Export and
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tionship among unions, governments, and MNEs, within the framework of labor
legislation, have tended to show that the implementation of various labor statutes
favored MNEs over workers. 87
The newly industrializing countries' policy of export-led growth requires a
stable and efficient, but not necessarily cheap, labor force. However, various
statutes affecting unions, strikes, conditions of employment, and minimum wage
laws, have caused many of these countries to become cheap labor havens.88 Their
current comparative advantage in world markets depends on their ability to keep
labor cheap and efficient. If industrial legislation was intended in part to address
the distributional equities in MNE-generated wealth, it has failed. MNEs inade-
quately compensate workers for their real contribution to manufacturing. In fact,
industrialization might be said to be taking place through exploitation of labor.
For instance, a department of the government of the ROK openly advertised its
cheap and abundant labor force. It stressed that the average wage level of the
ROK worker was about half that in Hong Kong, 30 percent of that in Japan, and
just about the same as the ROC.89 In addition to lower average wage costs, MNEs
benefit from these efficient and productive workers working 48 regular hours a
week, about eight hours more than in the United States.
Some MNEs have developed a consistent pattern of discrimination in wages
and general treatment of female workers, particularly within the export-free
zones.90 About 80 percent of the workers employed by foreign firms in these
zones are women. 9' Not only do they receive a fraction of what their male
counterparts receive in wages, but these women are also subjected to various
physical and sex-related abuses not tolerated anywhere in the home countries of
Employment: The Case of the Republic of Korea, 106 INT'L LAB. REV. 495, 504 (1972). This author
noted the following effects of exports on labor:
According to my estimation, every $1 million increase in exports of manufactures from Korea
will create, on the average and in the short term, jobs for some 500 workers in export
industries, about 150 jobs in their supporting industries and another 150 in consumer goods
and service industries. In the longer run its total effect will be much larger, partly owing to the
cumulative nature of the various employment effects and partly because capital investment
and construction works will be induced as a result of export expansion.
Id. at 514. The importance of these estimates lies in the fact that several of the labor intensive products
are those in which MNEs invested. See also Fong, Employment and Basic Needs in Singapore, 119
INT'L LAB. REV. 495, 497-98 (1980).
87. See Kassalow, Aspects of Labor Relations in Multinational Companies, 117 INT'L LAB. REV.
273 (1978); INT'L LABOR ORG., LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, SERIES No. 49, THE ROLE OF
LABOR LAW IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1975); AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION (D. Kujawa ed. 1973); D. KUJAWA, INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE (1975).
88. See E. UTRECHT, supra note 85, at 221.
89. See id. at 238.
90. Id. at 241-45. This is very serious when one takes into consideration the fact that women have
contributed significantly to the economic development of several of the East and Southeast Asian
countries. According to one study, in 1976 women constituted nearly a third of the labor force in the
ROC. Their share of the labor force in manufacturing was a little below one-half. See Galenson,
supra note 86, at 393.
91. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 80, at 339.
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MNEs. 92 The plight of female workers is widespread in Southeast Asia, and it
appears that Japanese MNEs may be more culpable than others. 93
Job related discrimination against women is hardly an isolated phenomenon
unique to Asia. 94 However, its scope, character, and intensity in this region when
compared to developed countries, appears more offensive. Due perhaps to cul-
tural reasons, the general awareness of the problem is low. 95 The commitment of
host governments to provide a strike-free labor force limits the options of these
workers .96
Despite the exploitation they suffer, it is not the case that workers do not
benefit from MNE investment. The real issue is whether the distribution of MNE-
generated wealth should reflect the actual contribution of labor. One commentator
suggests that in trying to assess the equities between MNEs and labor one should
consider that MNEs provide workers with higher wages and better working
conditions than they could otherwise obtain. 97 However, this suggestion seriously
misses the crucial issue. It is not a comparison between ex ante and expost wages
and conditions of work which is important. But rather, the issue is whether FDI
should make labor better off and whether it can make labor better off without
making MNEs worse off.
92. The following illustrates the plight of female workers:
The conduct of a Japanese technician named Kobayashi (aged 28) of "Korea F-One, Ltd."
shows well the contemptuous attitudes held by Japanese toward Koreans: the brutality, decep-
tion and violence used against workers by management; and the deep discrimination against
women workers which prevails in the [Masan Free Export Zone]. In 1972, Kobayashi made
advances to a certain woman worker. When she refused him, he started kicking and slugging
her, and as she tried to run away from him, he beat her more and dragged her before a Korean
director and continued to beat her, calling her a "base, insolent bitch." . . . Again in 1973,
Kobayashi started trouble by beating a worker over a trivial matter, calling all Koreans
"Liars." . .. The contempt for women workers and infringement on their rights by the
Japanese are best illustrated by a case in which the Japanese president of "Hokuryo Corpora-
tion," a frozen food processing industry, made women workers line up in his office. He
bluntly told them, "Koreans are filthy and smelly. We won't allow that here. Clean yourselves
up." In September 1974, a case of women workers being raped was confirmed as a fact,
though such incidents had long been rumored around Masan.
COMM. FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE OF SOUTH KOREA, Fact-Finding Survey on the Masan Free Export
Zone, 8 AMPO: JAPAN-ASIAN Q.R. 54, 62 (1976).
93. Id.; see also A.R. NEOANDHI & B.R. BALIGA, TABLES ARE TURNINo: GERMAN AND JAP-
ANESE MULTINATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1981). According to this study, Japanese MNEs
were more likely to hire Japanese lower level personnel managers than their counterparts. As a result,
they had significant operational problems with most of their non-Japanese employees. Id. at 83-84.
94. Sex discrimination against women in other countries has become an important subject of
inquiry. See, generally, the following describing the problem in various countries: Carr, Sex-based
Discrimination in Employment: Problems and Progress in Canada, 122 INr'L LAB. REV. 761 (1983);
Birukova, Special Protective Legislation and Inequality of Opportunity for Women Workers in the
USSR, 119 INT'L LAB. REV. 51 (1980); Connell, Special Protective Legislation and Equality of
Employment Opportunity for Women in Australia, 119 INT'L LAB. REV. 199 (1980); Nakanishi,
Equality or Protection: Protective Legislation for Women in Japan, 122 INT'L LAB. REV. 609 (1983);
Janjic, Diversifying Women's Employment: The Only Road to Genuine Equality of Opportunity, 120
INT'L LAB. REV. 149 (1981).
95. See supra note 92.
96. See E. UTRECHT, supra note 85, at 241.
97. See Scott, supra note 80, at 340.
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From the external orientation of these countries it can be said that policy
makers face a dilemma: having attracted MNEs through cheap labor, they cannot
easily improve working conditions without jeopardizing their industrial drive.
Since their comparative advantage lies in the productivity and cheapness of labor
in the production of labor-intensive goods, a rise in labor costs would reduce their
external price competitiveness. Therefore, any improvement in wages and work-
ing conditions would threaten the country's international competitiveness. In
fact, the recent deterioration of export performance of the ROK as compared with
other East Asian countries is said to have emanated from the decline in its
external competitiveness.98 In response, the ROK government has embarked on a
policy of limiting wage increases. 99
Workers in economies attracting MNEs through cheap labor are vulnerable to
exploitation. °° Their jobs depend on the extent to which legislatively created
economic and social conditions continue to attract MNEs. In the short term, any
decline in the economic conditions in export markets would result in labor being
called upon to accept even lower wages and benefits. If labor insists on higher
wages and benefits, MNEs are likely to shift their production to countries with
lower labor costs. Labor's desire to save jobs would make it more difficult for it to
demand better conditions, even if it had the opportunity.
In the long run, labor suffers the effects of cost-saving technological change.
For instance, the advent of automated equipment for assembling integrated cir-
cuits reduces the demand for manual labor. Because several of the products in
which countries with cheap labor economies have a comparative advantage have a
short life cycle, industrial policies which encourage concentration of these prod-
uct lines expose workers to short and long term vulnerabilities.
C. Effects upon Local Economies: Linkage and Control
The electronics industry in the ROK presents an interesting case. In 1973, over
80 percent of its total output in electronics was exported. In components, 86
percent of the output was exported to the U.S. and Japan. In consumer elec-
tronics, 90 percent of output was exported to the U.S. and Japan, and sold mostly
under the brand names of Japanese and U.S. MNEs. The export-free zone stat-
utes which encourage the shuttling of these resources between parents and sub-
sidiaries facilitated intra-firm transactions and correspondingly diminished any
linkage effects in the local economies. In other words, these statutes encouraged
the creation of industrial enclaves, the benefits of which went largely to indus-
trialized countries.' 0' In another case, less than 14 percent of the machinery,
equipment, and raw materials required in the ROC's export-free zones between
1966 and 1974 came from local sources.10 2
98. See Kincaid, Korea's Major Adjustment Effort, 20 FIN. & DEV. 20, 21 (1983).
99. id. at 22.
100. P. HASAN, KOREA: PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN A RAPIDLY GROWING ECONOMY 182 (1976).
101. The issue of enclave economies with very little linkage effects was addressed by Singer in an
article in the 1950s. See Singer, The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Coun-
tries, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 306 (1968).
102. Little, supra note 81, at 451.
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In addition, the success of the zones depended substantially on the existence of
international markets for the products. Through control over established brand
names and their network of foreign affiliates, the MNEs offered the desired link
between these export processing zones and the markets. Hence intra-firm transac-
tions between U.S. MNEs and their majority owned affiliates in developing
countries, excluding Latin America, equaled 65 percent of total manufactured
exports.10 3 For West German MNEs in countries where their investments are
significant, the corresponding figure was about 60 percent of exports.t°04 These
export zone statutes greatly facilitate the operational smoothness and functional
dynamism of MNEs, permitting them to shuttle resources among countries and
control their international marketing and distribution.
As to whether the wholly-owned or majority-owned operation is the preferred
MNE-affiliate relationship, several studies indicate that most U.S. and European
MNEs prefer wholly-owned operations. In contrast, Japanese MNEs readily
accept minority ownership. One recent study showed that about 75 percent and
66 percent of the subsidiaries of U.S. and European MNEs are wholly-owned as
opposed to only 26 percent in the case of Japanese subsidiaries. 10 This study
confirmed the results of a study by the OECD reporting the generally strong, but
declining, preference of U.S. MNEs for wholly-owned operations."
°6
Statistics show that only a small percentage of the operations of MNEs in the
countries covered in this study are wholly-owned by their parent corporations. In
the ROK, out of 381 enterprises affiliated with manufacturing MNEs, only 61 (15
percent) are wholly-owned. 07 The rest are majority owned. 08 However, while in
a distinct minority of cases, wholly-owned operations can be quite significant in
particular activities such as the electronics industry. By the end of 1973, foreign
investment in electronics in the ROK amounted to $104 million, 60 percent of
which was held by 12 wholly-owned subsidiaries and the rest by 42 joint ven-
tures.1m The ownership structures are not vastly different in other countries
within the region. U.S. MNEs in the export-free zones of the ROC usually retain
100 percent ownership in their operations. "0 Between 1967 and 1970, 25 percent
of FDI in Indonesia was wholly foreign owned while the bulk of the remainder
was at least 60 percent foreign owned."'
The nature of ownership acceptable to Japanese MNEs is not based solely on
their willingness to accept a minority position. It is also a result of the demands
103. The Role of Transnational Corporations in the Marketing and Distribution of Exports and
Imports of Developing Countries 5, U.N. Doc. No. TD/B/C.27197 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The
Role of Transnational Corporations].
104. Id.
105. A.R. NEGANDHI & B.R. BALIGA, supra note 93, at 69.
106. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: RECENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS 50 (1981).
107. INVESTMENT GUIDE -To KOREA, supra note 3, at 24. The statistics do not reveal information
about the size or nature of these 61 operations.
108. Id.
109. P. HASAN, supra note 100, at 179.
110. Ranis, Industrial Development, in ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN TAI-
WAN 248 (W. Galenson ed. 1979).
111. 1 T. ALLEN, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS REPORT 107 (1979).
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of the market. For instance, Japanese MNEs have preferred wholly-owned opera-
tions in export-free zones where the total output is to be exported to other
markets. In fact, 70 percent of their operations were wholly-owned largely for
two reasons. 12 First, intense competition and the fact that they supplied other
distributors under their own brand names made product quality vital. They there-
fore were less willing to risk any interference with quality by a local partner.
Second, full ownership gave them some flexibility in transfer pricing. 113
The implication of these statistics on ownership patterns is that industrial
legislation such as that of the ROK, the ROC and other emerging industrialized
countries, which encourages wholly-owned or majority-owned MNE operations
actually caters to the demonstrated wishes and needs of MNEs. Rules responding
to the desiderata of MNEs, especially those permitting firms the flexibility to
respond to various global economic stimuli and exploit low costs and profit
opportunities, might well be a more effective inducement for FDI than differen-
tial rates of return.
These arguments do not account for the fact that the vast majority of these
statutes seek to control the actual behavior of MNEs. Host governments are
seriously concerned about the nature and quality of MNE activities on their
economies. They seek greater and more efficient integration of MNE operations
into their local economies. MNE operations would be most beneficial to them if
they generated greater linkage effects and led to more efficient utilization of local
resources. To ensure that MNE operational decisions take into account national
industrial and economic policies, output targets, export levels, and the balance of
payments, local participation laws demanding that MNE operations be majority
owned by local interests have become commonplace." 4 Host governments, in-
cluding several countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America,"5 seem to believe
that local majority ownership, dictated by law, will translate into effective con-
trol. However, their real impact on the behavior of MNEs remains unclear. This
section argues that, in the vast majority of cases, laws requiring majority local
participation have not had any serious restrictive effects on the characteristic
behavior of MNEs. The reasons are not hard to find.
By nature, majority local participation statutes stress ownership and not effec-
tive control. They confer the legal right of control but many extraneous and non-
legal factors determine the effectiveness of that right. For example, the local
majority owner might not have the know-how or experience to run the operation
efficiently. Moreover, the industries normally targeted for local majority
ownership are those in which the MNEs enjoy a monopolistic advantage over the
local partner. MNEs can often use such an advantage to control subsidiary
operations. The insignificance of the local majority participation statutes be-
comes even more glaring in light of other government objectives.
112. See M.Y. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 146 (1976).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 2.
115. For a discussion of these statutes, see, for example, Gordon, Observations on the Nature of
Joint Ventures in Mexico: Are They Involuntary and Transitory?, 2 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 338(1979); Ness, Brazil: Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1017 (1974).
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Most of the newly industrializing nations choose to pursue growth through
exports. This strategy requires high quality, internationally competitive products,
a network of markets, established brand names, and efficient international mar-
keting and distributing systems. Local partners cannot ignore the fact that MNEs
can offer these advantages to export-oriented joint ventures. To meet their own
and the government's export objectives, local majority owners are virtually at the
mercy of the MNEs. One popular way to circumvent these statutes is to lease the
joint venture operations to the minority owner MNE for effective control. In fact,
in international marketing and distribution, ownership of the operations is not as
crucial as control over them. " 6 The attributes of MNE minority owners enable
them to control effectively the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of
imports and exports.
An example can be found in the manufacturing investments"7 of Japanese
trading houses in Southeast Asia. Most were motivated by the need to defend
export markets and to exploit the comparative advantage of the host countries in
exporting to third countries. About 80 percent of such investments were joint
ventures in which the Japanese investors took minority interests."' The strategy
of the Japanese parent companies was to maximize exports from Japan and
maintain high levels of intra-firm transactions between themselves and the joint
venture companies. Therefore, notwithstanding their minority position, their
affiliates received between one-third and three-quarters of their materials and
component inputs from the parents and also marketed their finished products
through them." 9
Thus it appears that the Japanese MNEs were concerned only with achieving
the degree of control necessary to attain their objectives. So long as the local
participation statutes permitted them to exercise the control necessary to meet
their objectives, minority ownership was acceptable. In this sense, Japanese
MNEs are not drastically different from U.S. and European MNEs; they all see
effective control as imperative.
The response of MNEs to local participation statutes in other developing
countries appears to be the same. Studies on denationalization and the market
power of MNEs highlight the ability of MNEs to circumvent various national
economic policies through their market power. 20 A recent study on the indi-
genization experience of Nigeria illustrates the ability of MNEs to block the
116. The Role of Transnational Corporations, supra note 103, at 6.
117. In the aggregate, Japanese investments in Southeast Asia are declining because of their
strategy of heavier FDI into developed countries. See E. UTRECHT, supra note 85, at 48. However,
the picture for individual countries might be different. American MNEs dominate in the ROC with 44
percent of the total FD1, whereas the Japanese and European MNEs hold 28 percent and 13 percent,
respectively. The trends are apparent from Table 5, infra p. 410-11. The picture is reversed in the
ROK where Japanese MNEs accounted for 47 percent of the total FDI with American and European
firms taking 29 percent and 13 percent, respectively. However, in Singapore in 1976, Japanese MNEs
held a mere ten percent of the total FDI as opposed to 36 percent for U.S. and 33 percent for
European MNEs. ALLEN, supra note Ill, at 94.
118. The Role of Transnational Corporations, supra note 103, at 6.
119. M.Y. YOSHINO, supra note 112, at 143.
120. See, e.g., BRAZIL AND MEXICO, supra note 13; Connor & Mueller, supra note 33.
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intended effects of a local statute.' MNEs operating in Nigeria used structural
reorganizations and other measures to not only manipulate but also to violate the
spirit and letter of the Nigerian indigenization decree.122 For example, an MNE
manufacturing for local distribution might divide its operations into a wholly-
owned manufacturing unit and a jointly-owned marketing and distribution group
in which the MNE would take a minority interest but find local partners known to
be incompatible with one another. The two companies would be in the same
building and share the same board of directors and officers. 3 As a result, the
MNE maintained effective control over its entire operations notwithstanding the
law.
Evaluating industrial legislation requires an examination of other related objec-
tives of host governments, such as protection of certain industries and the promo-
tion of technology transfer. Because such legislation is generally the product of a
planning group it tends to benefit the national economy and has usually been
followed by tremendous economic growth. Moreover, the legislation of some
developing countries protected from MNE participation, certain manufacturing
sectors in which local entrepreneurs had a decided comparative advantage in
world markets. The technology in these sectors was generally labor intensive,
requiring light and medium equipment which local entrepreneurs could easily
handle. Since these measures also permitted the screening of licensing agree-
ments for the quality, quantity, and price of technology transferred, they checked
the behavior of MNE licensors, and enabled local manufacturers to maintain their
export markets.
Though we cannot rule out the possibility of positive spill-over effects of joint
ventures on local partners, the benefits of local majority participation legislation
may still lie in the future. When local majority owners begin to acquire the
requisite know-how and managerial expertise, and to establish international mar-
keting links, the transformation of legal rights of control into effective control
may take place. The recent controversy between Dow Chemical and its former
joint venture partner in the ROK is a clear illustration of how these laws can, in
the long run, be effectively used by local partners. 24 In that case, questions arose
as to the price of material inputs supplied by a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dow
Chemical to the joint venture. The 50 percent local partner challenged Dow and
threatened a rescission of the contract if the price for these inputs were not
brought more closely in line with the world market price. 25 Dow Chemical
eventually pulled out of the venture. As more local partners understand the
international marketplace better, an increasing number of such revolts are likely.
One of the major objectives of industrial legislation has been positive linkage
effects between MNEs and the local economy. This analysis suggests that these
linkage effects have not been particularly positive. With the creation of export
121. Biersteker, The Illusion of State Power: Transnational Corporations and Neutralization of
Host-Country Legislation, 17 J. PEACE RESEARCH 207 (1980).
122. Id. at 215-18.
123. This is what Biersteker calls a two company strategy. Id. at 216.
124. The full story of the Dow Chemical venture has yet to emerge. However, see Breakup of Dow
Chemical's Joint Venture with Koreans Leaves Both Sides Unhappy, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 42.
125. Id.
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enclaves, isolated from the mainstream of economic activity, the benefits to local
economies have been sparse. However, in some specific cases the effects have
been substantial. In the ROK, the World Bank reported that foreign capital and
technology stimulated the development of local suppliers of component parts
which increased from 41 in 1965 to 702 in 1973.126 Furthermore, there is also
some evidence of increased subcontracting for parts from local sources in
India. 127
Finally, the rise of MNEs from developing countries should be noted.128 Most
of the MNEs come from countries competing for limited export markets in the
developed countries. It appears these MNEs would checkmate each others' strate-
gic location decisions, depending on the competitive forces. For example, from
the People's Republic of China (PRC), MNEs locating in the ROC are, in part,
making a defensive move. They will locate in the ROC to produce and export to
third countries in which they are losing their comparative advantage to ROC
exports. But the comparative advantage of ROC manufacturers lies in ROC
industrial legislation which significantly lowers their cost of production with
respect to labor, land, and other factors. 2 9 If this phenomenon continues, indus-
trial legislation could produce some positive effects in the host countries since the
technology requirements of MNEs from developing countries are less capital
intensive, more in tune with host governments' objectives, and likely to create
more linkage effects. 130
V. CONCLUSION
After being in force for several years, the effects-intended, perceived, and
actual-of industrial legislation are ripe for assessment. Central to the concern of
much industrial legislation is the MNE.
Blessed with tremendous financial, technological, human, and other re-
sources, MNEs stand as giants in the industrialization of several developing
countries. Their contribution to industrialization could be significant. Because
MNEs enjoy a very high degree of freedom and flexibility, they could also hinder
industrial progress of a country by stultifying its industrial growth by distorting
the distribution of the wealth they generate. Thus, industrial legislation has often
tried to encourage some aspects of MNEs' behavior while curbing or controlling
others.
This article addresses the impact of such legislation on the behavior of MNEs
and upon labor in some of the East and Southeast Asian countries that have been
most attractive to MNEs. It is apparent from this study that the desirability and
126. See P. HASAN, supra note 100, at 179.
127. See R.H. BALLANCE, J.A. ANSARI & H.W. SINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD 233 (1982).
128. See generally L.T. WELLS, JR., THIRD WORLD MULTINATIONALS (1983); MULTINATIONALS
FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (K. Kumar & M.G. McLeod eds. 1981).
129. See Chen, Hong Kong Multinationals in Asia: Characteristics and Objectives, in
MULTINATIONALS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 128, at 86.
130. See L.T. WELLS, JR., supra note 128. See in particular chapters 3 and 4 where he investigates
the nature of the linkage effects.
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nature of industrial legislation in newly industrializing countries depends on an
accurate understanding of the nature and motivations of the MNE. Without this,
most legislative efforts might be misguided and, therefore, useless for achieving
their intended effects.
Legislation intended to entice MNEs through tax incentives is usually not only
costly but also either redundant or ineffective. Laws designed to improve the
international competitiveness of labor-intensive products in order to attract MNE
production facilities have increased the dependency and vulnerability of workers
to the volatile external economic environment. Legislation intended to transfer
control in joint ventures from MNEs to their local partners has generally been
ineffective largely because such laws have not addressed the operational dynam-
ics of joint ventures which still permit MNE minority owners to exercise effective
control over their joint ventures.
Given the complexity of industrial legislation designed to address the nature,
quantity, quality, and timing of MNE involvement in host countries' industrializa-
tion process, it will be important for more work to be done in this area in relation
to other developing countries. Future work should address the normative issues in
legislating for industrialization. For instance, it might explore the design of
industrial legislation to provide the incentives for industrial growth while encour-
aging distributional equities in the benefits of industrialization. It will also be
important to address how such legislation might generate the necessary linkage
effects between MNE operations and various sectors of the local economy. Fi-
nally, there is the issue of denationalization. In an age when the relationship
between MNEs and the nation-state is not always cordial, it will be important to
assess how legislative measures might be used to encourage MNE participation
in industrialization without depriving host countries of their policy autonomy in
economic issues.
